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The strategies of Chinese and Indian
software multinationals: implications
for internationalization theory
Jorge Niosi and F. Ted Tschang
China and India are emerging as major entrants into the international software
industry. Both are rapidly learning through outsourcing with multinational
enterprises (MNEs) from advanced nations, yet their paths to this dynamic
sector are very different. Chinese software firms have focused on their domestic
market by working with foreign MNEs, while they move cautiously abroad. Indian
firms, which are already large, continue to expand overseas as well as to climb the
value chain. Different approaches to MNEs provide useful perspectives. At the
same time, the innovation systems approach is necessary to explain the
foundations of the industry. The article provides hypotheses and tests them. It
concludes that learning internationalization processes are different in Chinese
and Indian MNEs, and provides explanations for the different patterns.
1. Introduction
The software industry is experiencing a major delocalization trend, from developed
to developing countries (LDCs). In this trend, multinational enterprises (MNEs)
from both developed and developing countries are playing a major role. In the 1980s
and 1990s, India took the lead in fostering this industry, thanks to its large pool of
skilled low cost labor. Ireland and Israel followed suit. Since 2000, China and other
LDCs have been entering this fast-growing sector, but questions remain as to how
these countries can compete with India, or whether they even have to. In this
article, we have chosen to study and compare two significant LDCs that present
very different software industries—one emerged, India, and one emerging, China.
We examine both the differences and similarities of the growth and internationaliza-
tion strategies of these two cases, to better inform theory on how developing country
MNEs internationalize, and ultimately, compete. The rest of this section summarizes
the literature on the global software industry, its relevance to developing country
industrialization, and the place of India and China in this sector. The second section
recalls some contributions to the theory of the MNE, and derives hypotheses from
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these perspectives as well as from the existing literature on software industries in
India and China. In the third section, the article provides a discussion of India
and China’s MNE software sectors based on a combination of interviews and
secondary data. We conclude with a discussion of our evidence vis-a`-vis theoretical
hypotheses.
1.1 The evolution of the computer software industry
The computer software and services sector (CSS) emerged within the computer
manufacturing industry, from which it progressively detached itself. The emergence
of the present-day industry occurred in the United States through different stages.1
During the period around 1980–1994, the CSS grew by 20% a year to become one of
the largest world industries. The global packaged software industry was estimated to
be worth around US$ 250 billion in 2007.2 The USA still dominates 50% of this
industry. For example, Microsoft leads the operating system (OS) and office niches,
while Oracle and SAP compete to dominate the enterprise segments under pressure
from the world’s largest, IBM and Microsoft. Even as new niches form, consolidation
is ongoing, with companies specialized in particular niches entering different
segments occupied by other firms. Table 1 gives an idea of the size of the industry.
1.2 The globalization of software production
The outsourcing phenomenon started in the beginning of the software
“maturationphase;” outsourcing was first applied to software services, followed by
software products themselves.3 International offshoring is integrating independent
1In the first era (1950–1959) independent service firms appeared to provide programs that IBM and
other hardware vendors did not already sell embedded in their mainframes (Campbell-Kelly, 2004).
Software has evolved with the advent of various computing platforms, from the mainframe to the
minicomputer, then the personal computer, the networked environment, and most recently, the era
of the Internet and Intranet. Today, the computer software industry is usually presented as being
composed of some 27 niches. In terms of employment or sales, the most important activities are
software publishing, systems design, systems integration, custom computer programming, and data
processing.
2North American and Western European companies tend to obtain a larger percentage of sales from
applications (“products”) but they also provide services (hosting, systems integration, custom
software, data entry). Developing country firms produce more “services” than “products” as the
needs for services like customization, maintenance, and the like require substantial amounts of
technically skilled manpower.
3There are certain stylized facts about the software industry. First, there are lower barriers to entry,
and in combination with the increasing returns and network externalities of software goods, can
lead small firms to become leaders over very short periods of time. At the same time, while
technological change appears to be shortening product development cycles, the ever more complex
nature of software programs coupled with the ability to rationalize (i.e., partition and produce
software efficiently wherever best suited) has promoted the growth of outsourcing.
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companies of developing countries such as India and China into global value chains.
Outsourcing is becoming more frequent as software becomes more complex, and
cost becomes an increasing factor in production. Outsourcing is also facilitated by
the increasing modularization of software, and by the spread of knowledge in
software development processes. The outsourcing trend first created a need for
substantial amounts of human capital in the outsourcing provider countries. As first
India, then other developing countries entered these markets, scaling up both firm
sizes as well as project sizes became a critical goal.4 This resulted in the first Indian
multinationals—mega-firms that rival some of the largest US software service
firms in size.
Software has also been a vanguard for the internationalization of service
outsourcing, especially IT-enabled services such as business process outsourcing,
R&D services and so on. The case of India serves as a benchmark for all others, as
India was a first mover, and still has the largest and most developed software industry
amongst developing countries. However, whereas the Indian industry largely grew on
the basis of exports, the Chinese software industry initially started with products and
services for the domestic market. Since the early 2000s, as the potential for
outsourcing asserted itself, new Chinese entrants appeared, some initially servicing
multinational needs in the Chinese domestic market, while others entered regional
markets, primarily Japan. Thus, the two cases provide a contrast not only in terms of
initial starting points for internationalization, but also in terms of their recent
strategies.
Table 1 Global IT expenditures, 2006–2007
2006 2007 Growth (%)
IT services 467 496 6.3
BPO 421 462 9.7
Packaged software 230 249 8.3
Hardware 452 478 5.8
Total 1570 1685 7.3
(Amounts in US$ billions)
Source: IDC, NASSCOM, according to TCS, 2007-8 Annual Report, p. 55.
4However, there are clearer signals now that the countries most successful at developing outsourcing
sectors have actually benefited from age-old public policies and, at the same time, fewer investments
are needed in this sector (i.e., fixed costs are lower). However, public support for higher education
and human capital continues to be important in this sector as with prior ones.
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In order to grasp the internationalization of LDC firms, we have to understand
a few factors: (i) the entry mode of the firms—greenfield5 or acquisition; (ii) the
market-orientation—export or domestic; and (iii) the nature of growth—in
capabilities and other dimensions. At the same time, we need to understand the
LDC setting, i.e., its resource base and position in the international value chain.
We first summarize the major features of internationalization for our two cases:
 While some Chinese outsourcing firms have focused on the domestic market
serving foreign multinational clients, and others on the foreign market, both
types serve foreign MNE needs. In this sense, both Chinese and Indian firms are
“outsourcing-oriented” as well as internationalized.
 India’s industry was a “leader” in international outsourcing, and China a less
mature follower. This has necessitated Chinese firms to search for less prospected
markets, and markets where they are, by language, more culturally suited for
servicing.
 We can generalize by saying that the industries of both countries have found more
easily accessed and less contested markets. Thus, market orientation (domestic or
foreign) is a function of the relative competitiveness of the firms, as well as the
opportunities present.
 “Greenfield” subsidiaries have been the dominant entry mode for firms of
both countries, largely because of their limited financial resources and low starting
capabilities; however, both the leading Indian and Chinese software multinationals
have recently engaged in acquisitions, for both market- and asset-seeking reasons.
We will begin with a review of the literature on internationalization, and what
is known of developing country software industries. We will follow with our metho-
dological approach in Section 3, the two country industry cases in Sections 4 and 5
respectively, and a discussion of their implications for our hypotheses in Section 6.
2. Theories of internationalization and software outsourcing
Multinational enterprises have been the subject of a multifarious literature. In this
section, we draw on selected major perspectives to construct hypotheses about the
occurrence of outsourcing in the software services sector, with an eye to using these
hypotheses to guide the interpretation of our data.
2.1 Product life cycles and the relocation of industry to emerging economies
In the PLC perspective, new industries are born in the richest countries, most often
under the aegis of an innovative company (Vernon, 1966). The first countries to
5A form of foreign direct investment where a parent company starts a new venture in a foreign
country by constructing new operational facilities from the ground up.
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develop industries generally produce for their own domestic markets, and then
export. This is true for the by now advanced economies. In a final stage of this
phase, a trend towards dominant designs, process standardization and cost
reduction starts to assert itself. In a later phase, a shake-up occurs and the industry
moves to developing countries. Third-world multinationals emerge (Wells, 1983)
which nurture ownership advantages such as “appropriate technology,” i.e.,
software better suited to poorer markets, and organizational advantages such as
better capability to hire and train workers from LDCs. Lall (1983) points out that
the “ownership advantages” of developing countries, such as lower cost inputs, can
matter greatly. This is typically the issue in outsourcing, with the more recent cases
being the Asian latecomer countries in electronics, as well as India’s software
industry. The literature on Indian software outsourcing often cites the huge
opportunities that the country’s lower wages presented, while non-resident Indians
facilitated contacts with potential clients in the intended markets (Kapur and
Ramamurthi, 2001; Kapur and McHale, 2005). With these advantages, firms that
started in the domestic market tended to have greater success in the international
market.
2.2 Resources and initial opportunities of Chinese and Indian software firms
LDC new firms are generally more resource-constrained, given their country’s
latecomer status and lower revenues, and have lower capability (Lall, 1983). Their
motivations for internationalizing can be divided into market- and asset-seeking
(Dunning, 1998). A reduced domestic market and low labor costs, making LDC
firms competitive abroad, are the central elements of the market-seeking explanation.
Software outsourcing firms with ownership and labor advantages will seek
initial opportunities in markets where their limited resources and labor costs
can be efficiently and favorably employed in competition to address potential
clients’ needs.
Additionally, the most important factor dictating entry mode is the early resource
condition of the outsourcing firm, and the knowledge base or capability required for
it to operate. Indian software outsourcing firms started up and expanded early with
limited resources, and so have had to offer work for payment, and to grow through
retained earnings. Furthermore, software service firms do not have strategic
intellectual property. These past experiences and the existing evidence from India’s
software industry suggest that at least the largest software firms have tended to
grow through self-financing (Athreye, 2005a: 28). This suggests the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Software outsourcing firms with limited assets and intellectual
property will tend to grow via greenfield through investments or retained
earnings from services, rather than via acquisitions.
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2.3 The internationalization of software firm markets: cultural issues
Several theories predict that the market orientation of a firm is based on cultural
similarity. New firms start in their home (domestic) markets, and often choose
culturally similar locations for their exports and foreign direct investments (FDI) in
order to communicate with customers at a lower cost, and manage investments
better (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). In the value chain, the communications aspect
is presumably even more important since the outsourcing firm has to relate to the
client on a continuous “provider” basis, and not simply through a market
transaction. When this is coupled with the “weak” financial resource base
assumption, we arrive at the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: As software outsourcing firms with a limited financial
resource base internationalize, they will enter markets where cultural
differences, primarily language dissimilarities, are mitigated, or where
markets are less contested by multinational incumbents.
2.4 Foreign direct investments and location choice of LDC MNEs: the
synthetic approach
Dunning’s ownership, location and internationalization (OLI) approach suggests
that location-specific factors including natural resources, cheap labor, market size, as
well as “institutional” factors (e.g., intellectual property regulation, R&D incentives)
may present different advantages to different industries (Dunning, 1988, 1998).
If these observations apply to developing country MNEs, we would expect the
following hypotheses on market-seeking FDI:
Hypothesis 3: Software outsourcing FDI from the developing countries will
follow existing patterns of export to the largest and more affluent markets
for those developing countries. Thus, both Indian and Chinese MNEs will
invest in North America and Western Europe, and Chinese firms will also
invest in Japan.
At the same time, it is possible that these firms will enter other developing
countries should they require additional manpower, or if their current capabilities
have an advantage over their target markets. The preferred mode of entry would
depend on whether the resources are similar to existing ones, and whether
acclimatization is based on training:
Hypothesis 4: Software outsourcing firms will invest in other developing
countries, in order to access new labor pools when their home labor supply
becomes scarce or costly, as well as to exploit their organizational and
technological advantages in similar markets.
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2.5 The evolutionary approach to MNEs and the search for knowledge assets
Asset-seeking is the second major reason that motivates MNEs to internationalize
(Dunning, 1998). The rationale for acquiring knowledge assets is perhaps even more
critical for sectors depending largely on R&D, such as software. Kogut and Zander’s
(1993, 2003) theory of the knowledge-based MNE argues that companies differ in the
quality and quantity of the stocks of knowledge they possess, and will thus follow
different strategies based on a range of competencies, strategies and structures.6 For
Kogut and Zander, MNEs produce knowledge and search for new and complementary
knowledge, both in their domestic and international markets. Buckley et al. (2007)
found that Chinese firms moved away from market-seeking motives to natural
resource-seeking ones over time. Asset-seeking is related to firms’ continuing compe-
titiveness as they grow, that is, how firms improve their capability. We know that
software firms seek to upgrade their capabilities at all times (Athreye, 2005b), but at the
same time, this means that they also have incomplete knowledge assets, some of which
theymay not be able to build up easily internally. This suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Software outsourcing firms will obtain strategic knowledge
assets by acquisition. This could be done in either their home market or other
countries, depending on how the assets are also tied to market-seeking
strategies.
It is worth noting that the literature also accepts a second source of knowledge
improvement: foreign multinational enterprises may also provide demonstration
effects and learning opportunities to LDC firms (Meyer, 2004); this suggests that
software outsourcing firms’ capability can grow through their foreign clients. A third
source is the firms themselves. They are also known to engage in the self-
development of capability once they have reached a mature stage, as was the case
with the major Indian software firms in the early 2000s (Athreye, 2005b).
3. Research Approach
We will now briefly describe our data and the approach used to structure the data so
as to test the hypotheses. We utilize a combination of primary and secondary data in
order to bring out an understanding of the developmental processes and paths based
on the experiences of individual firms. Our analysis is based on interviews conducted
at various sites in India and China between 2001 and 2007, on secondary data, and
6Their work is itself based on the work of Winter (1986/2006) and Nelson (1991). Kogut and Zander
also built on the dynamic capabilities approach, which emerged from the landmark work by Nelson
and Winter and was eventually formalized by Teece and colleagues (1994, 1997). In their view,
“knowledge and learning are at the root of understanding how competitive advantage is gained and
sustained” (Foss and Pedersen, 2004: 342). Also, a high proportion of knowledge is tacit, embodied
in human experience, and circulates within the MNE through its personnel.
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on the literature.7 In particular, our Chinese case is based on interviews with eight of
the Chinese software outsourcing firms considered to be rapidly growing or
occupying niches, as well as officials from three government agencies. Most of the
firms interviewed represent a new breed of private firms, other than those already in
the industry supplying lower level products or services, and many started doing
localization and testing for larger MNEs trying to enter China.8
4. The Indian software sector
4.1 The Indian software industry
The Indian software sector has been extensively analysed, and it is well known that
many Indian companies started their development as subcontractors or “providers”
to MNEs based in developed countries (Arora et al., 2001; Arora and Athreye, 2002;
Athreye, 2005a; Joseph, 2006). While software exports from India started in the 1980s,
the real take-off occurred in the 1990s: from $105 million in 1989, exports attained
$6.2 billion in 2000, and around $32 billion in 2007, growing by over 30% a year. The
industry’s target is $60 billion in software exports by 2010. In 2007, software services
represent over 22% of total Indian exports ($140 billion) and are its main export item.
India has become by far the largest software exporter among LDCs, and trails behind
only the USA and Ireland in the world. Most exporting firms are Indian-owned and
controlled corporations; their size and export revenues are shown in Table 2.9
4.2 The Rise of India: capabilities meet opportunity early on
The growth of software industries in developing countries has been associated
with the availability of highly skilled but low-cost labor, the technical capabilities of
indigenous firms, and market opportunity (Arora and Gambardella, 2005). One of
the commonly cited factors in India’s growth has been its comparative advantage
in low-cost English-speaking programmers and engineers (Athreye, 2005a). The
opportunity was set for India by the increasing software outsourcing requirements of
7Approximately 27 firms were interviewed in India, and well over 30 firms have been interviewed in
China, including eight in the latter that were outsourcing-specific. All the interviews were conducted
between 2001 and 2007.
8The firms interviewed were: Isoftstone, BeyondSoft, WorkSoft, ChongRan, United Innovation,
Symbio, Hexin, Objectiva, and Ufida. ChongRan (or CS&S) is a more diversified, formerly
government-owned firm which was interviewed earlier, and which is included for comparison
purposes. The three firms that this article focuses on, Beyondsoft, Worksoft and Isoftstone, rank
among the top 13 outsourcing providers.
9Throughout this section, we rely on a combination of secondary information, such as annual
reports and news sources, as well as interviews that one of the authors has had with firms in the
industry (approximately 15 interviews with Indian software firms conducted in 2001, together with
follow-up conversations with employees of selected firms since then).
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developed countries—which resulted from an ever greater need to deal with software
complexity and costs. While the scale of the work (and the workforces) both
increased gradually throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the defining opportunity was
the year 2000 (“Y2K”) problem, which required many US, European and other
MNEs to rework older software prior to the arrival of Y2K. Even after the Y2K issue,
the outsourcing contracts that firms gained continued to become progressively larger
and more complex (Athreye, 2005b), driving further increases in scale and scope, to
the point where each major Indian software firm is now organized into as many as
a dozen “verticals” or industrial sectors. As far as capability was concerned, although
the firms started out small and relatively weak in capability, there was little
competition for the low-cost teams of programmers sent to operate out of US clients’
locations, presenting the notion of “low value-added” work with which the industry
was earlier synonymous (Arora et al., 2001). These teams learnt through interaction
on the job with clients, with training later becoming more formalized. This “onsite”
Table 2 The top IT software and service exporters (excluding ITES-BPO) from India,
2004–2005
Rank Company Exports
(US$M)
Employees
2007
Total Sales
2007 (US$)
Country of
control
1 Tata Consultancy Services 1,644 110,000 4.3 billion India
2 Infosys Technologies 1,502 88,601 3.1 billion India
3 Wipro Technologies 1,198 79,832 3.47 billion India
4 Satyam Computer Systems 745 49,200 2.1 billion India
5 HCL Technologies 588 42,000 1.4 billion India
6 Patni Computer Systems 342 14,000 560 million India
7 I-flex Solutions 245 10,900 NA USA (Oracle)
8 Mahindra British Telecom 202 NA NA India-UK JV
9 Polaris Software Labs 154 8500 225 million India
10 Perot Systems TSI (India) 145 6000 NA USA
11 L&T Infotech ND 7000 250 million India
12 Hexaware Technologies 129 7068 253 million India
13 Larsen & Toubro Infotech 123 7000 NA India
14 MASTEK 121 4000 227m (2008) India
15 iGate Global Solutions 118 307 million India
16 Siemens Information Systems 111 3100 NA Germany
17 Mphasis BFL 103 NA NA India-USA JV
18 NIIT Technologies 99 4500 221 million India
19 Flextronics Software Systems 94 3002 NA USA
Total 7765
Source: NASSCOM, as compiled by Balakrishnan (2006), and completed.
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(at the client’s location) work was eventually moved back to India, which, coupled
with the increasing scope of work, led directly to the large outsourcing facilities
of the present day.
4.3 Market-seeking behavior in developing and other “non-familiar” regions
4.3.1 Finding new service opportunities: from the USA to other developing regions
With the reduction of “easy” opportunities in the primary markets of Indian firms,
a more recent trend has been their entry into other geographic regions. Wipro has
been in Japan for some years, and many Indian majors are establishing themselves in
China, with Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) perhaps having the most significant
presence. TCS, the largest Indian software firm, has perhaps the most developed
multinational strategy in LDCs. TCS has also developed a large Latin American focus
(see acquisitions in Table 3).10 By mid-2007, there were 5000 TCS employees in the
region, including 800 in Uruguay and 3600 in Brazil and Chile.11
4.3.2 Opportunity for product firms: banking on less-contested markets
Whereas the staple of most LDC software firms is service outsourcing, product
development is an often-mentioned benchmark—one associated with higher
(potential) returns and risk than service outsourcing work. The own brand product
strategy has the potential not only for the highest profit margins of all, but is also the
most risky (Athreye, 2005a). Given the higher margins that service work obtains for
multinational clients of developed regions, Indian software outsourcing firms have
historically been reluctant to get heavily into software products.
The I-Flex case, however, clearly shows how product strategy can work.12 I-Flex
was founded in 1991 as a joint venture with Citicorp, with its earlier incarnation
10 The Hindu, June 20, 2006.
11Late in 2007, TCS was creating a centre in Guadalajara, Mexico, that will hire out 500 professionals
in the short term to deliver a $400 million contract to the Social Security System of Mexico. In all,
by early 2008, TCS had over 100,000 employees in 47 countries with revenues of $4.3 billion in the
fiscal year of 2007 (Table 3).
12Because of the low probability of success in own brand products, many Indian firms are moving
into product development in a more measured way, often via the development of products as a
service, or the “co-development of products” (i.e., working on behalf of a client). Such activities do
not carry the risk of making one’s own brand product for the international marketplace. Examples
of development for other product vendors include Tata Consultancy Services’ development of a
popular product for Microsoft, called Quadrem, an electronic marketplace, Brainvisa in e-learning,
Subex in fraud telecommunications software, and Hexaware in human resources software. The
upgrading of technology capability in order to perform this advanced work is accomplished through
different channels, not the least being by the acquisition of foreign firms (and their capability and
presence in markets). Another area is the domestic market for products. NASSCOM recently
observed that the Indian market for IT hardware and software could be as large as US15.9 billion,
having grown by 29% in 2006.
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Table 3 Some recent acquisitions and greenfield investments of the top 3 Indian firms
Outsourcing Provider Acquired company name Year Location Purpose (F, MP or ND)
Tata (TCS) Citigroup Global Services 2008 India ND: Add new capabilities in banking
GT Participac¸oes 2007 Brazil MP
TCS Mexico 2007 Mexico (Greenfield) MP & abundant low-cost labor
Tata Solution Centre 2006 Ecuador MP
PT TCS Consultancy 2006 Indonesia (Greenfield) market penetration
TKS Teknosoft 2006 Switzerland & France F/ND/MP: Add financial product to portfolio; access Europe
Total Communications 2006 Australia MP
Comicron 2005 Chile MP/ND: in banking
Diligenta 2005 UK ND: Enter life insurance BPO market
FNS 2004 Australia F: Add new banking product: BANK
TCS Iberoamerica 2002 Uruguay Greenfield MP: delivery centre
Wipro Unza Holdings 2008 Singapore MP in SE Asia
Infocrossing 2008 USA F: To be leader in IT infrastructure management
OKI Techno Centre 2008 Singapore ND: semiconductor design
Hydrauto Group 2008 Finland & Sweden MP in Asia and Europe
Enabler 2006 Portugal ND/MP: Target global retail sector
Nervewire 2003 USA F: Enhance capabilities in financial sector
GE Medical System & Health Care Infor. 2002 USA and Europe ND/MP: be a global player in life sciences products
Ericsson R&D Labs 2002 India ND: Enter telecom R&D
Infosys Koninklijike Philips 2008 Poland & Thailand ND: Acquire expertise in finance and administration areas
Infosys Technologies 2007 Mexico Greenfield MP: broad language skills
Citicorp Int. Finance (Progeon) 2004 India Greenfield MP: Capture Citicorp outsourcing business
Infosys Consulting 2004 USA Greenfield MP: expand presence in USA
Infosys China 2003 China Greenfield MP: expand operations in Shanghai
Expert Information Services Pty 2003 Australia MP: in Australia; F: acquire management skills and market
(F¼ functional, MP¼market penetration; ND¼ new domain).
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being that of an internal subsidiary providing services to Citicorp. From the
beginning, I-Flex’s leadership focused on products, and earmarked financial software
as the only sector of focus. Competition in financial products, especially at the “back
end,” including tracking of financial transactions, was less competitive than that
of other sectors. I-Flex initially branched into other emerging markets such as Africa
and South-East Asia, where competitors were weakly represented, and where its
lower cost software would be attractive. The company initially started with a
comprehensive banking product called Microbanker, but eventually worked on
a state-of-the-art replacement called Flexcube that embodied major improvements,
namely a modular architecture to which new features could be added in an extensible
manner. I-Flex worked with banking clients in countries such as Thailand, and also
developed a strong group of financial sector professionals to further infuse domain
knowledge into the product. With the release of Flexcube in 1997, I-Flex eventually
won over more clients in developed markets, eventually reaching 280 customers by
the early 2000s, and was deemed so successful that in 2006, Oracle acquired it
primarily to serve as an entry to higher value work in the financial sector. Despite the
success of I-Flex, no other Indian firm has been able to follow its path. In general,
success in products rests on technological superiority and costly marketing and
distribution networks. Indeed, many Indian firms combine a form of product
strategy with services in order to reduce the risk of own brand products.
4.4. Capability building: from organic growth to acquisition
Since the early 2000s, Indian firms have been moving up the value chain, in part
driven by the natural needs of their clients (Arora et al., 2001), and in part by the
Indian firms’ desire to upgrade themselves. Large firms like Infosys also face
problems when trying to move into the higher value end of the software value chain,
in part because clients are unwilling to relinquish the highest ends of the work to
their contractors, and because of their lack of such higher level skills.13 To confront
such problems of “upgrading,” established software service giants as well as pure
product firms have adopted a notable shift in strategy, including the use of
acquisitions to complement their previously dominant strategy of organic growth.
The largest companies, including TCS, Infosys, and Wipro have been actively
acquiring smaller companies, as have companies such as Mindtree in the second tier
and even product firms like I-Flex.14 To see how the industry has come to this point,
it is worth considering the choices that firms face in building new competencies
13Infosys annual reports, various years. Systems integration is one of the most complex tasks, one in
which US firms like EDS, Accenture, and IBM have a commanding market share. Indian firms, in
contrast, have found it more difficult to move into this sphere of work.
14For instance, in 2006, I-Flex acquired Mantas, a US-based software company, for about US$122
million. Historically, the greenfield growth mode was most dominant in Infosys—one of the most
conservative users of “war chests” in the industry. Recently however, following the pattern initially
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over time. After the initial phase of technological learning from clients, such firms
have faced the choice of either growing capability organically, or obtaining it via
acquisition. In this manner, Indian software service companies have targeted firms
in developed markets, typically buying foreign companies with specific expertise.
As our data for Indian and Chinese firms indicate, acquisition serves three
purposes: (i) new domains, or the growth of a new internal division based on another
new industry, i.e., a “vertical;” (ii) functional: to gain access to new functional or
technological expertise; and (iii) market penetration: to create a “beachhead” in
another country for delivery of services and products on site to that market. Table 3
shows a list of acquisitions for the top three Indian firms classified with this typology
where possible. It appears that Wipro has been particularly aggressive in acquisitions,
and TCS in foreign market expansion. Since many of their acquisition targets are in
developed country markets, these are also intended to serve as “bases” to help
the Indian MNEs to operate in those markets. Their acquisition ability is enabled
by the higher market capitalization of Indian companies relative to their targets.
5. The Chinese software sector
In contrast to India, Chinese software firms initially followed a domestic path but
this strategy has not precluded moves to outsourcing as either export or internal
market clients. Also, the “follower” status and lower resource levels of Chinese
compared to Indian firms meant that they have had to enter into markets that were
weakly contested.
5.1. From products and early services to outsourcing
In the early stage of the industry up to 2001, many Chinese software firms attempted
to work on a product model sometimes involving a basic application for a few
customers, or a systems integration model. By the end of this period, the systems
integrators were already reaching the limits of their rudimentary capability, whereas
the better product firms were thriving in the domestic market.15 Despite this success,
most Chinese firms making products for the domestic market have not diversified
into regional or international markets. The road for product companies has also been
generally hard because of a variety of reasons, including a lack of customer IT
maturity, fragmented markets, and intense competition at the low end from low-cost
set by Wipro and since then also adopted by other firms, Infosys has used acquisitions to acquire
competencies.
15By working in their domestic market, Chinese firms have had some successes with products,
including in enterprise management software (e.g., Kingdee and UFIDA), language translation and
office productivity software (e.g., Kingsoft), middleware (e.g., Tongtech), and Linux operating
systems (e.g., Red Flag software).
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domestic imitators and at the high end from financially strong foreign MNEs with
advanced technology (Tschang and Xue, 2005).16 The largest systems integrators also
faced problems in that they generally performed lower value-added work, including
installation of hardware and packaged software made by other companies, and
networking.17
5.1.1 The emergence of outsourcing in China
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, some Chinese firms started to see the potential
of foreign outsourcing, but the capabilities required to work at the average Indian
level were beyond many of them, and still are.18 There had been small amounts of
software-exporting activity, US$600 million in 2004, growing year on year, reaching
US$1.43 billion in 2006, and forecasted to increase to US$4.7 billion by 2009, or
a compounded annual growth rate of 51%.19 The challenge of growing this market
was initially an issue of seeking opportunities that barely existed. One way was to
focus on the Japanese outsourcing market, and a second was to target China’s own
internal market. Outsourcing in the form of exports of software services was already
underway in China by 2001, but in the beginning, firms were mainly focused on the
Japanese market. In 2006, China’s software outsourcing markets included Japan
(61%), the USA (21.8%), Europe (4.7%), and others (12.5%). The Japanese market
accounted for US$872 million.20
The Chinese market grew fourfold between 2003 and 2007, as shown in Table 4,
thus justifying the domestic market orientation of most Chinese firms. Table 5
illustrates the fact that China’s largest firms are oriented towards Japanese or
US clients. However, the largest of these firms are dwarfed by the largest Indian
firms, and most are even smaller than the smallest of the Indian firms in Table 2.
16Piracy is one of the problems that afflict product firms. One well-known product company that we
interviewed noted that their well-known product was so heavily pirated that it became a money
loser, and it was only the government stepping in to purchase their software in procurement
contracts which helped to save this line of business for them.
17One of the largest systems integrators interviewed earlier admitted that profits were quite low, and
in fact, there have also been recent reports of other systems integrators suffering from low margins
(Tschang and Xue, 2005). According to one interviewee, they may also have difficulty in trying to
upgrade operations along the value chain.
18According to an official, the margins from outsourcing were in the 30% range for the more
successful Chinese firms, mirroring margins from India, as opposed to being in the order of 10% or
less—as product and systems integration companies have experienced. The outsourcers have
ostensibly avoided trying to make products or to undertake systems integration work.
19Statistics are from the International Data Corporation (http://www.idc.com/). These numbers are
generally beyond the 30% growth rates that Indian firms were averaging in the 1990s.
20Source: http://www.ccid.com/. In another report, the Japanese market accounted for 59% of
China’s outsourcing revenue, compared to the US market’s 23%. Data from Analysiys (http://
www.analysys.com/).
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5.2. Entering the Japanese market
The size of the Japanese market, and its attraction for Chinese firms that want to sell
services offshore, illustrates a similarity to the USA–India situation in its early days.
Chinese firms were initially called on to do lower value work for Japanese clients.
Many Chinese firms seek to imitate the success of Neusoft, a firm that achieved the
strongest export performance by servicing the Japanese market. Other firms have
come up in the ranks. Japanese systems integrators are their main clients—these
occupy the same market niches in Japan as do US systems integrators like Accenture
and EDS for the US market. One of the issues that Chinese firms have reported in
dealing with Japanese clients is the greater degree of control and specificity that is
required by these clients. More recently, a number of software firms have also
focused on BPO, in particular to the Japanese and Korean markets.
Most of the outsourcing firms that have succeeded in the Japanese market started
independently of other service and product firms, suggesting that the necessary
competencies were completely different. Furthermore, not all the few earlier firms
that tried to move into software outsourcing have been successful, again suggesting
that prior competencies might hold one back. This pattern is similar to the early
experiences of Indian service firms that tried to move from services into products.
5.3. The Chinese domestic market: servicing western MNEs
In recent years, another new set of outsourcing providers has emerged in China.
This new breed of firms works with foreign, primarily Western, multinationals that
service the Chinese domestic market. These foreign MNEs have been strong in the
higher end product and service software sector in China; these include firms such as
Microsoft, Oracle, and BEA, and software services and systems integration companies
like IBM and Accenture. Many foreign, typically US MNEs suffer from a location
disadvantage in sourcing labor and accessing clients when trying to service the
Chinese market. Interpersonal relationships or “guanxi” are as vital to conducting
business in the Chinese software sector as in other sectors (Saxenian, 2005).
The difficulty of entering the Chinese market may also be due to differences in
Table 4 Size of China’s software outsourcing services
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Market size (100 million US$) 3.25 4.70 6.33 9.20 14.30 20 (est.)
Source: CCID Consulting, 2007
(http://www.ccidconsulting.com/upload/12592.gif; accessed Jan 12, 2009).
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Table 5 Top 20 software services outsourcing firms in China (2007)
Ranking English name Employee Capability level Representative Customers Markets
1 Neusoft Group 12,000** CMM5, CMMI5 Nokia, IBM, SAP, NEC USA, Japan
2 Insigma Technology 4000 CMM3*** Microsoft, Hitachi, NEC, Tokyo Stock
Exchange, Nomura Securities
USA, Japan
3 hiSoft Technology International 42300 CMM5 IBM, Oracle, Bea, Autodesk, HP, Microsoft,
Toshiba, Mitsubishi
USA, Japan
4 Dalian Hi-Think Computer Technology Co. 2359 CMM5 GE, NEC Group, Hitachi, NTT DATA, Nihon
Sys, Ltd. Mitsubish, Sony
Japan, USA, Europe
5 Chinasoft International 4400 CMM3 Microsoft, IFC USA, Japan
6 Camelot Information System (China) 41500 CMMI3 IBM, SAP, Accenture, Bearingpoint, HP USA, Japan
7 Beyondsoft 800 CMMI 3 Autodesk, Cannon, HP, Kyocera, Microsoft,
Oracle, CA, Fuji Xerox, IBM, McAfee, SAP,
Siemens, Sony Ericsson,
USA, Japan Asia Pacific
8 Worksoft Creative Software Technology 1000 CMMI 2 IBM, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, Oracle, GE,
Sony, Panasonic, PeopleSoft, TIBCO,
Siemens, Roche
USA, Europe, Japan
9 NEC Advanced Software Technology
(Beijing) Co
850 CMMI5 NEC Japan
10 HANNA (Shanghai) Strategies 800 – – –
11 Shanghai Chuwa Software Co., 1300 CMMI 3 NRI, Mitsubishi, Fujitsu Japan
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12 Shanghai Wicresoft Co., 1000 CMM3 – Japan, USA
13 iSoftStone Information Service Corp. 3500 CMMI5 Motorola, Symbio, Sony Ericsson,
GlaxoSmithkline
USA, Japan, Europe, Korea
14 Trans Cosmos Information
Creative (China) Co.
620 CMMI3 – Japan
15 Fujian Fujitsu Communication
Software Co.
257 CMMI 5 Fujitsu, CISCO, ORACLE, IBM, HP, MICROSOFT Japan
16 DGT 1000 CMM3 GE, Microsoft USA
17 iVision Shanghai Co. 162 – Mitsubishi, SAP, IBM, IT Frontier, Microsoft Japan
18 Dilingtong 200 CMM3 Mitsubishi Japan
19 Nanjing Fujitsu Nanda Software
Technology Co.
215 CMMI5 Fujitsu Japan
20 Intasect Inc 180 – – Japan
Sources: China outsourcing website; company websites and annual reports.
Other lists of top 20 companies do not include some of the companies in this list, nor do some sizeable companies in other lists show up here.
Financial figures are not available for many companies.
**Total number of employees, including outsourcing. The outsourcing division alone reports 4000 or more employees.
***Subsidiaries within this holding company hold varying CMM levels between 2 and 3.
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standards, administrative rules and programmes across regions and cities.21 In this
environment, MNEs have a greater need to “localize” products and content.
However, many Chinese companies did not have the capability to do higher
end services like systems consulting and design, although it was easier for them to
develop lower level work like localization, customization and systems integration.
This set of circumstances has enabled a convenient marriage between outsourcing
foreign software MNEs and supplier domestic firms.
5.3.1 The new Chinese outsourcing firms
As noted earlier, the recent Chinese outsourcing pattern has involved firms closely
connected to foreign markets, or to MNEs operating in China.22 While Chinese firms
had a limited capability early on, they have circumvented such limitations by
working on lower value-added services.23 A typical case is BeyondSoft, which started
localizing and testing products for MNEs entering the Chinese market, including
all Microsoft products in China, and HP products for Asia. Gradually, it has
worked its way up into higher-level work, including managing offshore development
centres for clients, learning organizational strategies from Indian companies and
Western clients alike. Over time, the company has managed to develop capabilities
in application development and maintenance, and to service more global work
of MNEs.24 Like other outsourcing companies in Beijing, BeyondSoft realized
the limitations of a local labor pool for technical talent, and by the mid-2000s had
started to open new centres in the so-called “tier 2” cities like Dalian, Wuhan,
and Tianjin.
Other firms also reported similar stories of entry and scaling up when interviewed.
Like Beyondsoft, Worksoft came into outsourcing through localization and testing,
21There are also at least three markets—corporate, government, and private. However, the
governmental market is strongly bound by policy and regulations, and many software and systems
contracts in the past supported domestic firms. Furthermore, at least in the past, it has been difficult
to sell services to some Chinese corporate customers.
22The origins of the recent rapidly growing outsourcing domestic firms that service MNEs in the
domestic economy are largely private, and hardly any appear to have been government-owned or to
have involved government investments.
23Since then, many Chinese software firms had until a couple of years ago been slowly climbing the
organizational “process maturity” curve, with the Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) capability
maturity model (CMM) level 3 or ISO 9000 certification being common to many of them. As of
2007, only about seven firms had reached CMM level 5—the highest certification—and not all of
them were of significant size or reputation (relative to the rest of the Chinese industry). This
contrasted with Indian firms, where many (over 50 as recently as a few years ago) had achieved
CMM level 5.
24At one point, they were trying different strategies, such as opening up dedicated offshore
development centers for MNE clients, as well as exploring joint ventures with Indian outsourcing
providers.
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but Worksoft has focused far more than other firms on offshore development
centres, and has a larger number of US clients.25 They have been one of the most
aggressive in seeking US funding, first from the US venture capital firm Sequoia in
2006, then listing on the New York Stock Exchange in 2007.
Like the Indian firms, Chinese firms are also building capability through
interaction with MNEs, and in recognition of India’s prowess, they increasingly seek
to learn from the Indian experience.
5.4. The strategy of rapid scale-up and diversification
Since the early 2000s, Chinese outsourcing firms have sought to scale up rapidly,
initially by hiring and training fresh graduates, but more recently, by engaging in
targeted acquisitions in order to compete for larger contracts from MNEs. There was
a strong sense that Chinese firms could not compete with Indian firms in terms of
scale and capability. Unlike some Indian firms, most of the Chinese firms’ clients
appear to be the independent software vendors (ISVs) themselves—these can
demonstrate a greater tendency to keep the highest value work to themselves than
end user clients would. Chinese firms may have had a difficult time “crossing the
chasm” between carrying out application development for ISVs and working on
services for the ISVs’ clients. In contrast, many clients of the Indian software firms
are actually end users of vendor software, where software is not part of the end users’
core business, and therefore, may be more amenable to outsourcing. While starting
out with servicing the domestic market, some Chinese outsourcing firms are now
beginning to do work for the same foreign MNEs on a worldwide basis. While this
work still tends to be consigned to a lower value added, it proves that at least in
software, starting from a domestic market does not limit a firm from eventually
servicing the same clients on international projects.
The speed with which the outsourcing industry grows under a globally
competitive environment requires a rapid expansion strategy for scaling up human
resources for individual firms. Many Chinese outsourcing firms are concerned with
their smaller scale, when compared to Indian equivalents. Most of these firms were
growing at rates as high as 50% per year by the mid-2000s, and that was mostly for
servicing foreign MNEs in the domestic market. Despite this, as of 2006, only five
firms had over 2000 employees, with the largest, Neusoft, having 4000 staff members.
The situation had changed by 2008, with Beyondsoft, Worksoft and Isoftstone having
4000 employees or more. In contrast, the largest Indian firms like Infosys, TCS, and
Wipro are at least ten times larger in size. While there appears to be sufficient human
capital to service the Chinese industry’s needs, firms have a difficult time when they
25Another secondary strategy is to focus on niche markets, which some of the smaller firms have
done. Examples include Objectiva (a software developer for the document-processing industry),
which was eventually acquired by one of its clients, and Symbio which operates at the higher value
end of the market.
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consider potential employees for proficiency in English or other foreign languages,
process capability, and other skills. Firms have approached this scaling up in two
ways. The first has been to open up development centres in so-called second tier
cities, hiring university graduates at lower wages than in Beijing or other high-wage
centres. Secondly, many Chinese outsourcing firms are adopting an acquisitions
strategy and are acquiring firms earlier than Indian firms did: Chinese companies
have acquired other firms when they were well below the 10,000 employee mark,
which is the stage that most Indian firms started their acquisitions.
As shown in Table 6, all three firms that we profiled earlier recently became
more aggressive in their acquisitions. Other outsourcing firms, such as Neusoft,
Chinasoft, and Longpro, are also creating subsidiaries abroad in order to be
close to their outsourcing clients, or acquiring firms to scale up faster. We have
classified acquisitions into the three categories used for the Indian case: functional,
market-penetrating and new domain-oriented. All three firms are targeting a variety
Table 6 Acquisitions by selected Chinese outsourcing providers
Outsourcing
Provider
Acquisitions
Name Date Located Purpose
Worksoft JV (unnamed) 2008 China ND: finance
Wireless Info Tech 2008 USA MP/ND: onshore development
capabilities for wireless
Pro-soft 2006 China ND: telecoms
Surekam 2005 – F: application service provision
Envisys 2005 USA F: consulting for customer relationship
management, business intelligence
software, systems integration
development
Beyondsoft Chongqing Xunmei
Electronics
2007 China ND: banking
Unis Biz Consulting 2007 China F: IT consulting
Eastern Software
Systems (ESS)
2006 India F: ERP solutions
ISoftStone Shanghai Jiefeng 2008 China F: enterprise application development
services
Akona Consulting 2008 USA F/MP: IT and business consulting,
especially US clients
Wuxi Hua Yang
Software Co., Ltd
2007 China MP in service of Japanese clients
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of these three aims with their acquisitions, that is, a wide range of strategic assets and
interests are under consideration, along with the general desire to grow bigger, not
only by organic growth, but by acquisition, and to be “market-seeking.”
Thus, Beyondsoft recognized the need to scale up as well as to develop new
capabilities, and new lines of business by acquisitions. In 2006, they acquired an ERP
solutions provider in India, and in 2007, a Chinese IT consultancy and banking
domain solutions provider. The stated intent of acquiring the Indian firm was to
obtain Indian expertise in developing systems as well as in software development
processes—two areas in which they considered themselves weaker.
At the same time, while the diversity of purposes exhibited by the acquisitions
suggests the intention to complement incomplete portfolios of capabilities, there are
indications from particular acquisitions of a specific strategy. For instance, while
Beyondsoft is reinforcing its local base of developers as well as seeking to learn from
Indian capabilities, Worksoft is seeking to penetrate a new market by establishing
“beachheads” in the USA, and Isoftstone is diversifying geographically. It is worth
noting that many of these outsourcing firms staff their management with Chinese, or
overseas Chinese, employees who have international experience and are fluent in
English. This has been augmented in recent years by the return of a number of
Chinese with valuable experience from Silicon Valley. Finally, in recognition of the
growth potential of outsourcing, both national and regional government policies
have sought to aid firms’ efforts to internationalize, and to scale up their work forces.
One of the most important problems that US-active Chinese firms have to confront
is the need to have stronger language skills and appropriate cultural backgrounds to
engage with Western clients.
5.4.1 Product firms moving to sell abroad
While the model for internationalization has been proved by product companies in
other sectors, such as Haier for white goods, and Lenovo for laptops, in software,
some Chinese product software firms are also moving abroad. These already include
lead product makers in the domestic market, such as China National Software &
Service Company, Kingdee and Ufida. These have started creating subsidiaries to
serve customers of their enterprise management software in parts of South-East Asia.
6. Discussion and implications for theory
We will now return to the five main hypotheses.
6.1 Initial start-up and entry mode: support for hypotheses 1 and 2
Indian firms have grown by retained earnings (hypothesis 1), and have
tended to enter new markets with “greenfield,” albeit often mostly sales, offices.
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However, recently they have been acquiring firms with the purpose of incorporating
new knowledge as well as a variety of products.
Hypothesis 2 is about expansion in culturally similar environments. The
hypothesis is strongly supported. By focusing on the USA, Indian firms are mainly
targeting “culturally similar” markets, i.e., markets where the English language is
dominant, and the largest and most lucrative markets (hypothesis 3). To some
degree, these larger, developed markets are also the most mature and ready to
outsource services. Chinese firms did the same with the Japanese market.
The third hypothesis concerns outsourcing to affluent countries that were early
entrants in the PLC. This hypothesis is also supported. Indian firms are outsourcing
providers to North America and Western Europe, and Chinese firms to Japanese
systems integrators. Our hypothesis tends to integrate the issue of outsourcing in
the product and industry life-cycle approach.
Hypothesis 4 concerns the behavior of third world multinationals vis-a`-vis other
developing countries. As predicted by Wells Jr. (1983), both Indian and Chinese
MNEs are now looking for new markets in other LDCs for their scanty products.
In addition, Indian firms are looking for cheap labor in other Asian and Latin
American countries.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are about how firms internationalize to markets in terms of
FDI. As pointed out in hypothesis 1, Indian firms invest in “offices” or “beachheads”
in North America and Western Europe, where they export the majority of their
services. Chinese firms do not seem to be entering Japan or the USA in the same way.
Thus, hypothesis 3 is only validated for India, possibly because of the protected
nature of the Japanese market—with Japanese systems integrators controlling access.
As far as hypothesis 4 is concerned, selected large Indian firms are also developing
greenfield investments and acquiring subsidiaries in other developing countries to
exploit their capabilities as software outsourcing and development centres, e.g., TCS
is opening up larger facilities in Latin America and China for services.26 This suggests
that Indian firms are finding that investment also involves acquiring or building up
subsidiaries in these regions. Again, this is likely to be due to the particularities of
each market, which reflects not only cultural, but also regional and even local
business practices. For India, the issue of continuing internationalization appears to
involve entry into developing markets such as China and Latin America, supporting
hypothesis 4. In contrast, Chinese firms have been more reluctant to enter new
LDC markets, possibly because of their continuing need to first compete in their
primary markets.
26In fact, some activities border on either confirming or unconfirming the hypothesis. For instance,
while India’s I-Flex has about 400 employees in its Singapore offices servicing the region (according
to the authors’ research), it is not clear whether Singapore should be considered as a “developing”
region as far as financial software product development is concerned, or as an advanced market
where advanced skills are available to be invested in acquisition.
290 J. Niosi and F. T. Tschang
Finally, in relation to hypothesis 5, Indian firms more clearly, but also some of
the largest Chinese firms, are increasing their strategic knowledge assets abroad.
We have identified the search for strategic assets in our data. Again, according to our
“stages model,” this search occurs at middle and late stages of maturity, which the
largest Chinese and Indian firms are reaching. Constraints on strategic assets in the
cases of both China and India, and more basic resource constraints in the process of
rapid growth in the case of China, are handled through acquisitions. The other
strategy of growing resources—hiring and training—is permanently ongoing. Being
followers to the international marketplace, Chinese firms feel the competition more
keenly when they venture out of China, and are thus under pressure to acquire
strategic assets at earlier stages of their development. That acquisition is important to
both India and China suggests that resources cannot be easily or rapidly upgraded.
In general, it might be said that as Chinese firms scale up and enter into
“international” competition, often to work for the same MNE clients as before, these
Chinese outsourcing firms also face the general difficulty of upgrading to “high
value” work, an obstacle which Indian firms faced.
7. Conclusions
While Chinese and Indian software industries were previously known to be following
two different paths, domestic versus export sales (Tschang and Xue, 2005), we have
identified a new outsourcing trend in the Chinese industry’s story. We have also
sought to reformulate—and integrate—existing theory to explain the differences
between the Chinese and Indian cases. Parts of the two countries’ industries are
converging on one another as they continue to diversify and increase value-added
activities. It might be noted that further convergence seems to be occurring, as
Indian firms have recently also been looking at their domestic market.
We find general confirmation for the PLC-ILC as well as the OLI approaches.
Cultural factors also explain some contours of internationalization of LDC firms and
asset exploitation versus asset acquisition is also useful and receives support.
However, our story is more complex because we have managed to integrate
outsourcing processes in the internationalization of third-world multinationals.
Our study also suggests that even as we test for general high-level theories at
a country level, it is important to bear in mind the complexity of the individual
firm’s experience. While a loose, staged process can be said to be at work, there is no
universal path among LDCs to nurture an outsourcing industry. The competitive
landscape is always dynamic and LDC firms are always situated in idiosyn-
cratic contexts as a result of the firms’ time of entry, existing competition, and
opportunities available. This requires strategizing across these factors in order to
achieve the firms’ goals. Given this evidence from the Indian and Chinese software
industries, we may also conclude that the PLC-OLI theory draws a useful but sketchy
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picture of the sector’s evolution. Analysing the substrate of a sector at a deeper level
of institutional detail provides nuances for both propositions and prescriptions
alike.27
Finally, the largest firms in both countries are, in spite of their differences,
engaged in a persistent pattern of moving up within the international value chain
towards higher value-added segments. This is a challenging strategy, and requires
them to shift from greenfield investments to acquisitions. That acquisitions are
required for multiple, interrelated reasons further suggests that the process of
internationalizing is complex and path-dependent.
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